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The object relations and relational psychoanalytic traditions can have a 
profound effect on the practices of social science research and, in the UK, this 
is taking place largely in the tradition that has come to be called ‘psycho-
social’.  My own research practice has been moving in this direction for some 
time and it has become evident to me that the use of psychoanalytic concepts 
that derive from the object relations and relational traditions have radical 
effects on every aspect of research. By every aspect, I refer first to the 
substantive analysis of phenomena that have social and psychological 
aspects (which surely includes most phenomena of interest to social science). 
I also refer to the trio of principles informing research that I refer to in the title 
of this chapter as ontology (how the person as subject of research is 
theorised), epistemology (how the status of the knowledge generation process 
is understood) and methodology (how these together inform how the 
researcher goes about finding out). Not in the title, but also implicated, is the 
subject of research ethics. After an outline of the project that I use as an 
illustration, subsequent sections of this chapter deal with ontology, 
epistemology, methodology and research ethics. 
 
The reason for calling this research ‘psycho-social’, rather than just 
psychoanalytic, is to emphasise that the social and societal parts of analysis 
should be inextricable from the psychoanalytic. Whereas the relational turn 
has often emphasised just that – relationality (among people in both the 
external and internal worlds), psycho-social research attempts also to situate 
this explicitly in the societal settings involved. Arguably the object relations 
tradition has always been capable of casting light on social relations, while 
concentrating on how they get introjected and projected and the 
transformations that occur in the internal world. 
 
In this chapter I shall illustrate just how I have used concepts from relational 
and object relations psychoanalysis to inform one research project. It is about 
becoming a mother for the first time1 and is part of a large research 
programme, funded by the British Economic and Social Research Council, 
entitled ‘Identities and Social Action’. The focus on understanding identities in 
the context of social action is a relevant context in which to use a psycho-
social approach and the mothering identity is perhaps the most relational of all 
identities, with intersubjective effects that ripple out into all other relationships 
and identities. 
 
I am going to explore two interrelated ways in which my current research 
project engages in relational thinking, largely through the work of Winnicott 
and Bion. First I will briefly outline my theoretical approach to maternal 
identity, drawing on relational thinking. Second - my main emphasis - I 
describe the research practices that follow and what I learn from them. 
 
Becoming mothers: the research project in outline 
                                                 
1
 ‘Identities in Process: Becoming African Caribbean Bangladeshi and White mothers in Tower Hamlets’. Wendy 
Hollway (PI), Ann Phoenix, Heather Elliott and Cathy Urwin. ESRC-funded grant number RES 148-25-0058. 
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In order to include the ‘societal’2, we wanted to be sure to situate the new 
mothers that we studied and, in terms of the sample, did this in two ways. 
First we drew all our mothers from one London borough – Tower Hamlets – 
which has high levels of deprivation and disadvantage, a history of 
accommodating waves of immigrants, and a recent surge of policy initiatives 
concerning children and families. The population of Tower Hamlets is 
ethnically mixed, has a high percentage of Bangladeshi Muslim families, many 
now second or third generation, and a growing number of young 
professionals, largely white, living in the newly developed areas close to the 
City, the financial district of London. Because we wanted to conduct all our 
interviews without translation, we did not include any of the newly arrived 
groups, for example from Eastern Europe, whose first language was not 
English. Apart from this, we aimed to reflect the ethnic and class mix of the 
borough as best we could with twenty mothers. Our research questions 
reflected the several theoretical frameworks that can inform an understanding 
of identity processes: we wanted to know about women’s experience of 
becoming mothers, how dimensions of social difference such as ethnicity, 
religion, culture, age and class impacted on their changing identities and how 
they were positioned by expert discourses that were available through health 
and social services and media. 
Methodology was a central focus in our research project as well. Identities 
have been largely studied in social science through word-based methods. We 
wanted also to learn about the embodied, unconscious, taken-for-granted and 
practical aspects of identity formation and change that an interview-based 
method might not unearth. The choice of these dimensions already indicated 
the theoretical resources we were drawing on in formulating our research 
questions, notably psychoanalytic. Specifically we wanted to see if a method 
could illuminate what role is played by processes of identification in identity 
formation. 
The fieldwork involves a combination of free association narrative interviews 
and psychoanalytically-informed observation. With regard to the interviews, 
each of the twenty women is interviewed three times, first ante-natally, 
focusing on the story and meanings of the pregnancy as well as anticipations 
of birth and motherhood, and twice after her baby is born. The second 
interview takes place between four and six months after the baby’s birth. It 
focuses on the birth, changes and issues since birth and the mothers’ 
evolving identities as their babies do more for themselves. The final interview 
is held around the baby's first birthday. The interview record (listened to as 
well as read in transcript form) is supplemented by field notes that record 
aspects of the research interaction that takes place outside the recorded 
event. They also record the interviewers’ subjective responses to the setting 
and the interview relationship, based on the principle of the value of using the 
researchers’ subjectivities as instruments of understanding. The interviews 
are analysed using an interpretative methodology that pays attention to the 
'whole' narrative, to the meanings produced in the researcher-participant 
                                                 
2
 I am a member of a European network called the International Research Group for Psycho-Societal 
Analysis which uses ‘societal’ to differentiate its focus from relational; the macro from the micro. 
Some prefer the term ‘social formation’ to avoid the static and unitary implications of society and 
socital. 
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relationship, links between parts of the account, to conflicts and tensions 
within accounts and the unsaid as well as what is said.  
With regard to psychoanalytically-informed observation, trained observers 
visited six of the sample mothers, once a week for one year, and observed 
them with their babies. The observers use no mechanical recording device but 
after the event write detailed descriptive notes in the tradition of baby 
observation (Rustin 1997, Miller et al 1989). Despite our attempts to select for 
diversity, the observer group was predominantly white (5 of 6) and largely 
British (4 of 6) and all middle class, less ethnically diverse than our sample 
mothers. We were not aiming for social matching of researcher and 
participant (Gunaratnam 2003) but wanted cultural heterogeneity that would 
provide diversity in the insights that the seminar group could bring to bear on 
the observation material. 
  
A child psychotherapist3, also experienced in baby observation and 
developmental research, led a weekly observation seminar group (which 
included the researchers) to develop understandings of the observations 
based on their total subjective responses to the presented notes. Notes of the 
observation seminars provided a further source of data, based on the 
preliminary and provisional impressions and building up over the year. This 
seminar also continued for a year. The resulting data illuminate the relational, 
embodied and less conscious aspects of identity processes as well as 
everyday, relational practices during the transition to motherhood. Those who 
are familiar with the infant observation method, as developed for training 
purposes by Esther Bick at the Tavistock clinic (Bick 1964, Briggs 2002), will 
recognise how closely we paralleled that method. 
 
2. Ontology. 
What are the theoretical tenets about maternal subjectivity which informed this 
research? The understanding of identities in the context of settings, practices, 
relations and biographies as well as intrapsychic, intersubjective and 
discursive processes is the theoretical terrain for this work. By calling this 
psycho-social, we mean that it reduces to neither individual (internal, 
intrapsychic) nor social (external, discursive, structural, interpersonal) 
processes. A psycho-social approach (which draws on psychoanalytic 
paradigms of subjectivity at the same time as understanding the social 
construction and situating of identities) has the potential to transcend various 
troublesome binaries that abound in identity theory: natural-social, universal-
particular, freely chosen-heavily regulated. In this context, I focus on the new 
mother’s identity transition: one in which she experiences herself as primarily 
responsible for a totally dependent and vulnerable new life, which she grew 
within herself. It is therefore supremely relational.  
 
My approach to understanding subjectivity (Hollway 2006) is as an ongoing 
dialectic based on the tension between intersubjectivity and individuality in 
                                                 
3
 Dr Cathy Urwin acted in this role and led the observation side of the field work, taking considerable responsibility 
for the transformation of this method from a training into a research method and from a focus on babies’ 
development to one on the identity processes involved in becoming a mother. A special issue of the Journal of 
Infant Observation, forthcoming in 2008, edited by Cathy Urwin features the six case reports written by the 
observers based on the research project. 
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relational life (and therefore in thinking and action). I draw on Thomas 
Ogden’s idea of the analytic third as: ‘a struggle with the complexity of the 
dialectic of individuality and intersubjectivity’ (2001: 20). I have brought this 
out of the clinical situation and used it to think about subjectivity in dynamic 
movement as a result of the recurrent unconscious identification of the subject 
with another, which continuously creates a third intersubjective space which 
potentially transforms that subject. It is then possible to imagine how one or 
other of these two sets of dynamic tension – individuality and intersubjectivity 
- will dominate at different times of a person’s life and in different 
circumstances and social positions.  
 
I developed my theoretical approach to maternal subjectivity through the 
problematic of the capacity to care (Hollway 2006), starting with 
conceptualising the care involved in mothering a dependent and vulnerable 
infant and working outwards and forwards in time to think about triangular and 
serial relationships in families (fathers and other carers and siblings), gender 
differences, friendship, self care and caring across difference and distance. 
 
Ogden said that his concept of the analytic third was indebted to Winnicott, 
specifically his idea that ‘There is no such thing as an infant’, meaning that 
without maternal care there would be no infant. According to Winnicott (1958), 
the infant begins to organise a sense of self within the psyche-soma of its 
mother. This development of self is intersubjective: from early omnipotence to 
the capacity for concern and its expression through reparative action. The 
mother is ruthlessly used as an extension of itself. This is bound to change 
her. The baby’s intersubjectivity is in dynamic relation with the mother and 
with the child’s individuality, successively grasped through processes of 
differentiation. The accompanying conflicts between ruthless use and care, 
omnipotence and reality, facing good and bad in the same object, tolerating 
frustrations, wanting to merge and needing to be separate, have continuing 
and profound effects on the mother’s identity. The power of these effects can 
be partially explained by the way the baby’s experiences chime with aspects 
of her own subjectivity in which these conflicts, while not as new, may remain 
and reemerge shockingly in her intersubjective experience of her baby. 
 
Intersubjectivity is the infant’s only available option and the resultant demands 
are likely to precipitate the mother into conflicts between her own needs and 
desires and those of her baby. The mothers in our research group expressed 
these in different ways and it changed over the course of a year. They can be 
understood as being situated on a continuum. At one end they could embrace 
being mothers with fervour, like an identity project, and at the other desperate 
to get their lives back, while feeling responsible, sometimes painfully so, for 
their babies’ welfare. Their positions in relation to this continuum were not 
singular however. It seemed that these extremes represented a conflict 
present in all the new mothers, even though the strength of the various 
feelings varied across the sample and over time. 
 
I came to see the identity processes involved in becoming a mother as 
revealing a fundamental tension that is more opaque in other relational 
identities; that is between putting oneself and the satisfaction of one’s desires 
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and ego needs at the centre of one’s actions on the one hand and care for 
others based on identification with the needs and wishes of another or others. 
I summarised the challenge to maternal subjectivity as follows: 
 
The mother-infant relationship is paradigmatically characteristic of the 
dialectical relationship between individuality and intersubjectivity which 
characterises all post-infant subjectivity, but with a different accent. 
This is because the infantile experience of the intersubjective space 
shared with the mother is not expunged with the development of 
psychological separation and differentiation but coexists in dialectical 
tension with it. The demands of new babies (…) ensure that new 
mothers are challenged to re-experience the intersubjective state of her 
baby in an intensified way, in parallel with whatever state of 
differentiation she has achieved as an adult. At the same time this will 
involve identifying with her mother through the vestigial experience of 
her own infantile and child state. Thus the demands on the new mother 
call up a doubly intersubjective dynamic, from both sides of the mother-
infant couple. The infant’s self development will have to be paralleled 
by maternal development (Parker 1995), involving recognition of its 
need to differentiate. All this adds up to a picture of maternal 
subjectivity as unique amongst adult subjectivities. (Hollway 2006: 65). 
 
It is possible that there will be systematic differences in how new mothers 
from different cultural groups experience this tension. Such an expectation is 
based on a sociological and social anthropological literature that sees western 
societies as continuing to go through changes that lead to individualisation, for 
example in family forms and women’s roles (Beck-Gernsheim 1983). In terms 
of Tower Hamlets, we are looking to see how this is played out differently in 
the Bangladeshi mothers and the African mother in our sample, in contrast to 
the white British, and other white and black ‘western’ mothers, and if it varies 
with class. While the examples of some of our Bangladeshi mothers who live 
with extended families in cramped conditions suggest in some cases a lack of 
individuation (Woograsingh 2008 forthcoming), in others this can lead to the 
kind of reserve which led another Bangladeshi mother to describe herself as 
‘a very private person’ even (or perhaps especially) within her husband’s 
family where she lived. Psychological boundaries cannot be read directly off 
social arrangements. 
 
From a social perspective, it is helpful to use positioning theory (Skeggs 1997) 
to analyse our data. It helps us to notice the multiple ways in which the 
women in our sample are repositioned when they become mothers for the first 
time. In their extended families they remain the daughters of their parents and 
the sisters of their siblings but the new baby is now the ‘baby’ of the family 
(displacing some who were youngest daughters) and many of them appear to 
get access to a new cluster of identifications with their own mothers. For 
example, Liyanna, a London-born Bangladeshi, at the second interview had 
ensured that she showed some family photos to the interviewer. The photo is 
of her mother with her older sister, herself and her younger brother. She and 
her sister, who she describes as having ‘always been pretty close’, have a 
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difficult relationship with their mother who has been chronically depressed. 
She says 
 
It’s this picture, it’s so strange. ((baby cries)). I was showing it to my 
sister the other day, and I said to her that when I used to look at this 
before it was like “oh there’s Mum and Amina” (her sister) … and you 
just sort of flick through it, you know, and I never really stopped to 
analyse it. But I said to her, since I’ve had Maryam, I look at that 
picture and I know exactly what my Mum was feeling when she was 
looking down at my sister. (Int: Really?) ‘Cos I know how I feel when I 
look down at her, and when I play with her, and it’s just taken on a 
whole new meaning, you know, it’s like there’s my Mum and that’s her 
first-born child, it’s a little girl, same as me, you know, and I can just 
see the love and the emotion that she’s feeling when she – when she – 
when that picture was taken. 
In this case, Liyanna’s identification as her mother’s baby (‘same as me’) 
passes through her close older sister, to enable the parallel with her first-born 
daughter. Through this she acquires an emotional understanding that was not 
accessible before she became a mother herself. 
 
In the above analysis, positioning theory has been rendered psycho-social by 
the use of the concept of identification. It goes beyond identification as used in 
social theory which usually refers to the process (untheorised) by which an 
individual identifies with a social group, to draw on the Kleinian tradition of 
psychoanalytic theory to emphasise processes of unconscious identification, 
introjective and projective. Bion (1962 and see Hinshelwood 1991) uses the 
concept of projective identification, which he bases on mother-infant 
unconscious intersubjectivity, to refer to normal, primitive processes of 
emotional communication. This is my basis for understanding relational 
thinking. It also forms the basis of how I understand the intersubjectivity at the 
core of all subjectivity – more or less overlaid by the separation processes 
that are central to the development of a differentiated self (Hollway 2006).  
 
The claim that all subjectivity is underpinned by relationality (or 
intersubjectivity) is complicated by a set of theoretical problems concerning 
the relatedness and defensiveness or otherwise of differentiated individuals4 
and the mergedness or otherwise of relationality. This issue remained mired 
in theoretical disagreement in the ethics of care literature that characterised 
the 1980s and early 1990s, starting with Carol Gilligan’s ‘In a Different Voice’. 
I have discussed this in detail elsewhere (Hollway 2006 chapter2). Here I 
want to clarify the difference between the Kleinian concept of identification 
and that used less precisely to imply ‘overidentification’. In the latter, 
identification assumes that, in order to identify with another, one has to feel 
their feelings (like empathy) and that this involves losing the boundaries 
between myself and the other. In contrast, Hinshelwood defines identification 
as follows: ‘Identification concerns the relating to an object on the basis of 
perceived similarities with the ego’. He goes on to comment that ‘The simple 
recognition of a similarity with some other external object that is recognised as 
                                                 
4
 For example, see Layton (2004) on defensive autonomy in young North American women. 
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having its own separate existence is a sophisticated achievement’. 
(Hinshelwood 1991:319).  Liyanna’s identification with her mother (‘I know 
exactly what my Mum was feeling’) perhaps illustrates that identification often 
falls in between these two ends of a continuum, perfect separation and total 
merger, and oscillates along it. Jessica Benjamin’s problematic of 
identification with/across difference (1998) also reflects the fact that this is no 
mean achievement. It requires conceptualising a form of identification that 
does not involve the merging of parts of oneself with the other 
(connectedness held within the binary with separateness). 
 
Bion (1962) takes the mother-baby relationship as the prototype for 
unconscious intersubjective communication in his theory of the container-
contained relationship and how it provides the capacity for thinking and 
learning by experience. The mother’s capacity to receive, via projective 
identification, the states that the baby is incapable of processing itself, is a 
crucial resource for the development of the baby’s self. She is faced with her 
baby’s need for her to contain and metabolise or detoxify the projected 
anxieties and desires of the infant and return them in bearable form, having 
been able to do the thinking that the baby cannot do for itself. She is plunged 
back into an identification with the vulnerability of infancy and at the same 
time needs recourse to her differentiated subjectivity which enables her to 
think about what her baby needs so as not to return his projection in an 
unmodified form. (Of course, depending on her own state of mind, this is not 
always possible.) It is possible, I think, to infer such relational dynamics from 
our data and thus begin to theorise the changes this requires in the new 
mother.  
 
For example, Zelda, a white South African, is here described in an 
observation record as she goes in to see if her son, Tom (at 3 months old) is 
ready to wake from his daytime sleep: 
 
Tom is at first still but slowly begins to wake, wave his arms, lift his 
legs, and cry out, one single cry…   Zelda talks gently to Tom as he 
wakes up and sits on the edge of the bed, waiting until he is ready, she 
strokes his tummy and his chin, talks and brings her face close to his, 
she kisses him. She strokes her fingers gently down his torso, asking 
him if he is ready yet to be awake. Tom doesn't seem sure, his eyes 
flicker open as he begins to wriggle and stretch and rub his face, but 
they quickly shut again. Zelda talks to him about not being sure... ‘Are 
you ready? Are you still sleepy?’ 
Slowly Tom’s eyes open more and he looks first towards the light of the 
window and then towards the cupboard, which is on the opposite side 
of the room from the window. His eyes seem to fix here and he looks 
intently. Zelda continues to talk to him, and he turns to look at her; 
fixing her with his gaze. She tickles him gently and strokes his mouth 
and chin, encouraging him to smile. He yawns several times but then 
smiles and is greeted by Zelda’s warm delight. Zelda now picks him up, 
he wriggles slightly and seems uncertain, she holds him at her 
shoulder and he yawns and crashes into her and then cries out a 
weary irritable moan. Zelda asks him ‘what is the trouble, is he still 
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tired, perhaps he is not quite decided?’ She rocks him gently and pats 
his back and he begins to smile and hold his head up and look around. 
‘That's better,’ says Zelda, ‘now you feel better’. 
 
This fully awake mother is capable of identifying with the uncomfortable 
transition between sleeping and waking which she has come to know in her 
baby. She is therefore capable of attuning to the subtleties of his changing 
state. Yet the boundary between her and Tom is clear ‘Are you ready, are you 
still sleepy?’. 
 
In summary, identification is a valuable concept for conceptualising the 
constant psychic traffic between psyche-somas (to use a phrase from 
Winnicott that does not split minds and bodies). Through this process, and 
given sufficient separateness, people have the capacity to identify with 
another person’s affective states, experiences and meanings. This is a core 
principle of my relational ontology. The use of Ogden’s dialectical notion of the 
third tries to ensure that subjectivity is also understood to be in constant 
dynamic and often conflictual tension. In the following section, I discuss how it 





Bion’s concept of the container-contained relationship not only affords a 
powerful tool for understanding the tension and mobilisation of 
intersubjectivity and individuality in new mothers, it also provides a radical 
foundation for a psycho-social research epistemology. We learn through 
identifications with objects. This is at the core of the idea that researchers can 
use their subjectivity as an instrument of knowing. Applied thus, it is not about 
mothers identifying with their babies, but about researchers identifying with 
the mothers and babies participating in the research. In clinical terminology, 
we are talking about transference dynamics. Thinking in this paradigm is 
based in intersubjective not intrapsychic processes; moreover it does not split 
the cognitive and affective (for Bion, the capacity to think depends on the 
processing of emotions). Bion’s phrase ‘learning by experience’ refers to this 
kind of thinking: 
The capacity to know through the process of learning from one’s own 
experience is a function that has to be acquired and it comes about 
from introjecting an external object (mother) who can understand the 
infant’s experiences for him and then gradually introduce him to himself 
(Hinshelwood 1991:298). 
 
The container-contained relation provides an explanation for the affective 
development of our capacity for thought and it does so, not from the 
perspective of a unitary rational subject, but through unconscious, 
intersubjective dynamics, initially in the relation of mother and infant, where 
the mother functions as a container and the baby’s projections are contained. 
This kind of unconscious intersubjectivity continues throughout life as we 
learn to use other containers (and parts of ourselves) to help us to think. Links 
between the containing mind and its content are of three kinds: love, hate and 
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the wish to know (L,H and K). The same goes for research (see below). The 
resulting principle is that we, as researchers, are exploring methods that draw 
on our whole selves – our subjectivities - as the research instrument. I 
understand these responses through the concept of identification. 
 
To talk of using subjectivity as an instrument of knowing is to contest received 
ideas about objectivity. Although the possibility of objectivity in the positivist 
sense has been comprehensively dismantled, an understanding of what takes 
its place has become mired in the dualism of realism and relativism which 
underpins a similar binary between objectivity and subjectivity. I find the non 
dualistic treatment of objectivity and subjectivity in the psychoanalytic 
literature helpful in conceptualising subjectivity in a way that does not get 
mired in relativism.  By objective, I mean, following Winnicott, when an object 
‘is discovered to be beyond omnipotent control’ (Phillips 1988:114) which is 
when it becomes ‘an object objectively perceived’. This usage can 
accommodate the critique of objectivity enabled by the constructivist turn, 
which is widely recognised as establishing that reality is nonetheless always 
mediated through the constructions that are involved in comprehending it. 
Objectivity conceptualised thus can be pursued through the use of oneself 
(the researcher) as an instrument of subjective knowing.  
 
Bion’s understanding of the difference between learning from experience and 
needing to know is one example (1962). He is sceptical of the kinds of 
knowledge that are stripped of emotional experience, whose raison d’etre is to 
substitute rigid control of the world that can be thought (-K) for the uncertainty 
of being open to new experiences through thinking (+K). In pursuing the goal 
of a kind of knowing stripped of affect, the protocols of positivist science when 
applied to the human sciences resemble ‘the aim of the lie’ more than they 
resemble ‘the aim of the truth’ (Bion 1962 p48). This description resembles 
Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s critique of ‘instrumental reason’ which defines 
objects according to ‘how they may best be manipulated or controlled’ (Alford 
1989:139).  Instrumental reason stems from a failure to transcend narcissistic 
omnipotence so that it is pursued defensively through symbolic activity.  
According to Alford (ibid), it robs the thinker of the possibility of ‘concern for 
the object qua object’.  This kind of concern, which Alford links with 
‘reparative’ as opposed to ‘instrumental’ reason, provides a way of thinking 
about an alternative condition for objectivity which is also the basis for a 
research ethics. In this mode, care or concern for the object will involve laying 
oneself open to the new experience and using the resources of one’s mind as 
the instrument of learning, as free as possible of the defences against finding 
out something that could pose a threat to one’s self and the beliefs that form a 
carapace around it. Keats made a similar distinction in his notion of negative 
capability (which is actually very positive…). As Keats saw it, there is an 
‘irritable reaching after fact and reason’ which, for negative capability, needs 




In summary, the psychoanalytic understanding of objectivity is helpful in 
recognising that the objective use of subjectivity is a challenge involving 
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knowing the difference between myself and the person or situation I am trying 
to understand. Projective identification often refers to relational dynamics 
where this is not achieved, where it suits one or other party to lodge unwanted 
aspects of self in the other. Once this is recognised, it is possible to build 
safeguards into research to help awareness of these threats to objectivity, as I 




 So how does one design a piece of empirical research on the identity 
processes involved in the first-time transition to being a mother that is based, 
ontologically and epistemologically, on the principles of psycho-social 
subjectivity including the unconscious intersubjectivity of the baby-mother 
pair? The methodology must take into account this way of approaching 
identities both between the participants and in the research relationships. 
Relational thinking should inform the learning by experience of researchers, in 
ethics, data production and data analysis. I am going to focus on data 
analysis. 
  
I will not dwell on the interview method used in the Becoming a Mother project 
– the Free Association Narrative Interview - since that has been documented 
elsewhere (Hollway and Jefferson 2000). Suffice it to say that it depends on 
eliciting the kind of experience-near accounts based on free associations, on 
the basis of which the subsequent interview questions and data analysis can 
suggest interpretations about the affective content and meaning of various 
parts of a person’s narration. Its limitations inhere in the way that this method 
depends on an individual’s narrative, based in language. This means that it 
may only partially bring out unconscious intersubjectivity, being most likely to 
miss how this works through embodied communication.  We addressed this 
limitation in two ways.  Our field notes around interviews became increasingly 
influenced by the genre of psychoanalytic observation and these feed in to our 
analysis in important ways. For example, the researcher who interviewed 
Sylvia write in her field note after the second interview ‘At the end of the first 
interview I felt quite bored, ready to leave. This time I am fascinated … I am 
keen for her to keep talking.’ Another member of the team, having listened to 
both the interviews in succession, noted how she warmed to Sylvia much 
more in the second interview. These gave the group a clue as to what kinds of 
dramatic changes were taking place in this new mother which informed our 
further thinking about the data. 
 
The second way was the use of the ‘infant observation’ method, adapted for 
research purposes, alongside the interviewing to provide us with data that 
were not dependent on participants’ accounts. Significantly, the form of 
learning that it offers the researchers and observers is based on the very 
same processes that it assumes to be the basis of mother-infant 
communication: projective identification. In terms of a clinical psychoanalytic 
methodology, we are therefore borrowing a data analytic method based 
initially on transference dynamics. 
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We have used the Esther Bick infant observation method (see A.Briggs 2002) 
and adapted it as little as possible. This is the method in which our six 
observers and their group leader have been trained. For example, although 
our research focus is mothers, not – as has traditionally been the case in the 
observation method – the infant or child, if the mother and baby are in 
different rooms, the observer sits with the baby (as in the original method). 
Because of the relational principle concerning the infant’s and mother’s 
intersubjectivity (described above), we proceed on the basis that we can learn 
about the mother by observing the baby (and of course, observing the baby 
with the mother). CHECK CATHY. There are also often other family members 
around – notably the mother’s partner and her mother and father and siblings. 
By observing their relationships with the mother and with the baby, we can 
ensure that the mother is multiply placed in her relational settings. 
 
This attention to the setting is a key part of what makes the method psycho-
social, as opposed to relational-psychoanalytic5. Observers can often observe 
the new mother as daughter, sibling and wife/partner as well.  Additionally, 
there is a fair bit of movement between homes in our sample: both white 
working class and Bangladeshi women move between parents’ (or parents-in-
law) home and a home they are often just in the process of establishing with 
their husband/partner or on their own with the baby. This aspect of the setting 
also brings out different aspects of their relation to the baby and their maternal 
identity. For example, the interviewer and the observer both first encountered 
Rhamin, a British-born Bangladeshi new mother, in her father’s house, where 
she lived until after her baby was born. For several years previously she had 
been primarily responsible for the care of her nephew while her older sister 
went to work. The house had the feel of a nursery since Rhamin’s father’s 
new wife also had two young children and other grandchildren spent time 
there. There was a great deal of action and liveliness in contrast to the 15th 
floor flat to which she moved with her husband after the baby was born and 
where she was often alone with her baby. She frequently returned to her 
father’s house and the observer often visited her there. Her identity as a new 
mother came across very differently in these two locations.  
 
In terms of the broader societal setting, the location of our sample in a single 
Borough, with the same local services on offer (including the same hospitals 
in which babies were delivered) makes it possible for us to research the 
environment, including its history in relation to different ethnic and class 
groups represented in our sample. We expect the research to have relevance 
for professional maternity and child care services in Tower Hamlets, for 
example, in relation to the continuing effects of traumatic births, the 
contradictory professional handling of breast and bottle feeding information 
and support.  
 
Observers take no notes in the session, but have been trained to write up 
notes afterwards. This method is based on detailed, often microscopic, 
                                                 
5
 Clinical relational psychoanalysts would perhaps point out that the setting of the clinical session is 
very well-defined and provides a strong frame in which to understand what takes place in the more 
general social context. In this light, perhaps ‘psycho-social’ simply refers to non-clinical settings; the 
kind that inevitably characterise research, as opposed to clinical, practice. 
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observation of embodied relations (see Zelda and Tom, above), including 
those with the observer herself. Her aim is to defer analysis and privilege 
description. A valuable source of data is her own emotional responses to what 
she is observing and these are duly written down. Taking her turn with the 
other observers over a cycle of a few weeks, her notes are read out to the 
group, which met for 90 minutes weekly.  The group’s task is likewise to use 
members’ subjective responses to the case which the group can reflect upon 
them and help the metabolisation of observers’ experiences. Identifications 
with any or all of the participants who have been observed will be present in 
this material. The different identifications in the group provide a kind of 
triangulation and contribute to the analysis of the material. An example of the 
first is when the observer was wondering what the significance of the mother’s 
home culture in West Africa was for Martina when her mother visited and 
wanted to take the baby back with her. In this case group members could 
contribute their varying knowledges of that culture and together think about 
what the maternal grandmother’s offer might signify in that context. An 
example of the second is when one observer who was treated in very 
inconsistent and careless ways by the mother she was observing, ‘was able to 
process my hurt and angry feelings and to think about them as belonging to 
Azra who had no other way of communicating them. Azra lost her mother 
when she was fifteen and was denied the opportunity to work through some of 
her conflictual feelings towards her mother’ (S.Layton, forthcoming in Infant 
Observation 2008).  
 
A different group member acts as rapporteur for each session that deals with 
a particular case. Both sets of notes (individual observation and seminar 
discussion) constitute the data set for each observed mother. The three 
researchers attend most of these sessions, but absent themselves when the 
case is one of a mother they have interviewed. This is because the 
observation group does not wish to mix the data derived from the two 
methods until the seminars are concluded. The research team, who are 
conducting between them all the interviews, have chosen, by contrast, to hold 
together as much as possible the two sources of data.  
 
The observation method was intended to enable us to see identities that are 
less the product of conscious, intentional production through narrative, more 
sensitive to affect, to unconscious intersubjectivity and to embodied aspects 
of identity. This has broadly turned out to be the case. Two further aspects are 
striking however. First is the way that the method captures the mundane 
practices (and the emotions that are inextricable from these) involved in the 
going on being of mother and baby over time. This is generally not what is 
expressed in words. Second, a weekly visit succeeds in recording the ups and 
downs involved in identity change processes. Becoming a mother involves 
conflictual dynamics which are not necessarily represented in words. The way 
that identity is understood is, not surprisingly therefore, more in line with 
psychoanalytic theory: recognising of unconscious conflict, changing over 
time and fluid and more embodied. Its concept of relationship is different (not 
two separate individuals interacting but two selves engaged unconsciously in 
communication, holding and transforming parts of each other). In summary, 
although this is a generalisation that does not apply across all cases, this 
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method was more likely to show us the emotional upheaval involved in 
becoming a mother. 
 
The method also produced data that are richly descriptive, situated in space 
and time, particularly within the family and more broadly in Tower Hamlets. I 
have already referred to the fact that several mothers moved a lot between 
the family home of their parents or parents in law and their own flat (either 
shared with their husband or occupied on their own). The change in settings – 
which would probably have been missed over the course of only three 
interviews in a year - was informative because we saw them situated 
differently as daughters, sisters, aunts, wives, at the same time as being new 
mothers. 
 
5. Ethics and the use of subjectivity as an instrument of knowing 
 
The quarrel about objectivity and subjectivity in research has always had an 
ethical dimension: what kinds of research methods of data production, data 
analysis and interpretation are safe? Positivist science operationalised this 
question by concentrating on reliability and validity. Critics of psychoanalysis 
argue that the power relations that are inextricable from interpretation render 
its use for research unethical. In post-positivist circles, ethics of interpretation 
have been restricted to a social perspective: the power relations between 
researcher and researched and how to equalise them or minimise the power 
of the researcher. Despite widespread uptake of post-structuralist theory, 
power is almost always assumed to be negative and thus to be avoided, 
unlike in Foucault’s idea of the positivity of power, which suggests that the 
beneficial and harmful effects of power are questions to assess empirically. I 
am bringing in to qualitative empirical social science research two principles 
that are commonly regarded as unsafe: the use of researcher subjectivity and 
the use of interpretation (according to some rendered all the more unsafe 
because it is outside the testing ground of the ongoing analytic relationship 
Frosh and Emerson 200?).  
 
Identification also provides a useful starting point for conceptualising ethical 
relating, which should involve recognising others for what they are (not for 
what you want or need them to be nor for how they might want to be 
recognised). As I have shown, psychoanalytic theorising of identification 
problematises how we can differentiate between ourselves and others in ways 
that enable us to identify with their experiences without confusing their 
situation with our own. In research ethics, this applies to how the researcher 
construes what she experiences and whether it is a fair and respectful way of 
knowing participants.  
 
The following extract from an observation raises ethical questions. Azra had 
started to feed Zamir (who is ten weeks old) with his bottle. 
 
There was a knock at the door and Azra put Zamir in his chair and 
followed her husband to see who had called. Zamir looked at his 
mother as she was retreating. I could hear someone talking to them. 
Zamir was sick and a distressed look came over his face and he began 
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to cry. (I wanted Azra to return). Azra returned and told me it was 
someone selling rugs. (…) Azra noticed that Zamir had been sick and 
said that he was naughty. She reached down and held onto one of 
Zamir’s legs. She pulled his leg and he came out of the chair and his 
head went towards the floor. He hung upside down for a few second 
before she turned him the right way up and put him on her knee. He 
was moving about, his legs agitating back and forth and his body was 
writing around. Azra said he is always moving about like this and she 
had to hold him firmly. She handled him a bit roughly. She wiped the 
sick from around his mouth two or three times and then removed his 
top. Azra tried to give him the bottle and he refused to take it (I found 
this painful to watch because she seemed to be forcing him to feed and 
he was struggling to prevent her.) She tried again but this time by 
putting the teat at the corner of his mouth and at an angle to find a way 
of his accepting the teat. Zamir gyrated his body in protest. Azra tried 
again and Zamir cried. I commented on his having more to drink this 
week as I noticed the bottle was bigger. Azra said yes it was a 6oz 
bottle. I said that must be because he is getting bigger. Azra said that 
her Dad thinks that he is too small. She told me that her cousin has a 
really big boy of four months (…) Azra tried again to make Zamir feed 
who was now clearly upset and distressed. Azra stopped trying to feed 
him and sat him up and he calmed down and looked around the room. 
Azra tried again to feed him and he accepted the bottle. 
 
The infant observation training method is based on a recognition that every 
observer will powerfully identify with the vulnerability of the new baby (we 
have all been one) and that these emotions must be carefully managed on 
behalf of ensuring an ethical relationship to the family. Here the observer is 
witnessing a distressing scene and she is not meant to intervene to try and 
change the mother’s behaviour or make recommendations. However, she 
does make a more subtle intervention which arguably has positive effects. By 
commenting on the larger size of the bottle, she elicits a story which conveys 
the pressure on Azra from her family to get Zamir to grow faster. Even before 
the story, she says something very helpful: ‘that must be because he is 
getting bigger’. By witnessing the scene of the struggle with the bottle, by not 
getting agitated as Azra is, and by noticing the increase in the bottle size and 
Zamir’s weight, the observer seems to be enabling Azra’s anxiety to be 
processed by containing it. It is possible that this changes Azra’s state of mind 
sufficiently to enable Zamir to feed, which he does soon after. This is an 
example of ethical relating in a research setting that goes beyond the formal 
ethics strictures of informed consent, doing no harm and not leaving a 
participant in an upset state (see also Hollway and Jefferson 2000, chapter 5).  
 
The sensitivity to her own emotional reaction to the baby’s unhappy state, 
recorded in brackets to differentiate it from the main focus of the observation 
which is outward looking, indicates that she is remaining capable of 
processing her own discomfort, which will make her a more containing and 
more accurately recognising presence, as her intervention demonstrates. This 
also enables subsequent data analysis to benefit by this processing and 
produce an understanding of Azra which is not blinded by unease into making 
 16 
inappropriate judgements about her mothering. Earlier I gave an example of 
the seminar group’s role in helping the observer process her difficult feelings 
about Azra. The group provides a mental space for relational thinking that is 
containing and helps symbolisation of these reactions. Group data analysis of 
interview material fulfils a similar function. 
 
In recognising that the (inevitable) use of researcher’s subjectivity runs the 
risk of not achieving good enough objectivity (in the psychoanalytic sense), 
we have built three sets of safeguards in to the research, all based on the 
relational principle that it is unprocessed, uncontained intersubjective 
dynamics that are liable to compromise objective knowing of external reality. 
First, as I have already described, the observation seminar provides some 
shared thinking to help the group process elements of emotional experience 
generated in the observers (and shared by other group members on hearing 
the observation notes read aloud). The seminar notes provide a record of this 
process. Second, we are increasingly using a group form of data analysis 
because of how fruitful this has proven to be in generating insight which 
combines and goes beyond the understanding of individual researchers. 
Third, the research fellow – herself a mother living in Tower Hamlets – has 
access to a consultant who is trained as a psychotherapist, whom she can 
use in the manner of clinical supervision to support her in articulating and 
working through dilemmas, difficulties and blind spots in relation to her 
potential identifications with the mothers and babies.  
 
The relationship between interviewer or observer and participant (or the 
relationship, mediated by a transcript or a tape recording between researcher 
and participant) can be conceptualised in terms of the containment and 
recognition provided (Hollway and Jefferson 2000). The observation seminar 
goes further however to provide observers with a kind of supervisory and 
group containment for their experiences with mothering and family 
relationships. In this way there is structured, formal support, which is regular 




My purpose in this chapter has been to use the example of a research project 
on becoming a mother for the first time to illustrate how psycho-social 
principles can systematically inform the ontology, epistemology, methodology, 
design and ethics of research. I have shown how psycho-social principles are 
defined in practice, drawing on object relations psychoanalysis alongside 
positioning theory and close attention to the wider societal setting, to 
understand the processes involved in identity transitions. At the time of 
writing, the field work is only just complete but it is clear that this paradigm 
has radical implications for social research. First, this approach is capable of 
delivering a different understanding of identities: less dualistic and taking 
account of emotions, their embodiment and the effect of past experiences on 
present identity conflicts and change. Second it can go beyond the binary of 
realism and relativism by working rigorously through the implications of the 
principle of using researcher subjectivity as an instrument of knowing. This 
involves putting into practice a different conceptualisation of objectivity. Third, 
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this use of subjectivity and the safeguards put in place to help objective 
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